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LOST WILLS: THE WISCONSIN LAW
ROBERT C. BURRELL* and JACK A. PORTER**
I. INTRODUCTION
The law of Wisconsin is well settled that once a will has
been validly executed and has not been revoked, it may be
admitted to probate even though the original copy of the will
cannot be located at the death of the testator.1 Wisconsin
Statutes section 856.17 provides as follows:
Lost will, how proved. Whenever any will is lost, de-
stroyed by accident or destroyed without the testator's con-
sent the probate court has power to take proof of the execu-
tion and validity of the will and to establish the same. The
petition for the probate of the will shall set forth the provi-
sions thereof.
2
Therefore, where the testator had a will which was valid at the
time of execution but which cannot be located upon the death
of the testator, the statute, in effect, prescribes the procedure
for establishing that the will has not been subsequently re-
voked by the testator. Revocation of a will may be effected by
"[b]urning, tearing, cancelling or obliterating the will or part,
with the intent to revoke, by the testator or by some person in
the testator's presence and by his direction."3 Other than revo-
cation by the terms of a subsequent will or codicil4 or by opera-
* B.A. 1968, University of Northern Iowa; J.D. 1971, University of Iowa; partner
with the law firm of Borgelt, Powell, Peterson & Frauen, S.C., Milwaukee, Wisconsin;
member, Wisconsin Bar.
** B.A. 1967, University of Iowa; J.D. 1969, University of Iowa; partner in the law
firm of Foley & Lardner, Milwaukee, Wisconsin; member, Wisconsin Bar.
1. Wis. STAT. § 856.17 (1973); Estate of Fonk, 51 Wis. 2d 339, 187 N.W.2d 147
(1971); Estate of Markofske, 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970); Estate of Rosen-
crantz, 191 Wis. 109, 210 N.W. 371 (1926).
2. This section has remained unchanged in substance since its enactment in 1849.
The original version of the statute provided:
Whenever any will of real or personal estate shall be lost or destroyed, by acci-
dent or design, the court of chancery shall have the same power to take proof of
the executive and validity of such will, and to establish the same, as in the case
of lost deeds.
Wis. STAT. ch. 84, § 12 (1849). In 1858 a minor modification was made in the language
of the 1849 version of the statute, and the circuit court rather than the court of
chancery was designated to take proof of the will. Wis. STAT. ch. 98, § 14 (1858). In
1878 the county court was also given the power to take proof of the will. Wis. REV. STAT.
§ 3791 (1878). The statute then remained unchanged until enacted in its present form
effective April 1, 1971. 1961 Wis. Laws, ch. 339, § 26.
3. Wis. STAT. § 853.11(1)(b) (1973).
4. Wis. STAT. § 853.11(1)(a) (1973).
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tion of law upon the marriage,5 annulment or divorce' of the
testator, there is no other way to revoke a will in Wisconsin.7
Accordingly, if the original copy of the will is not found at the
death of the testator and if it has not been revoked by the
testator, it follows that the will must have been lost, destroyed
by accident or destroyed without the testator's consent. In
other words, if a will is lost, destroyed by accident or destroyed
without the testator's consent, the testator could not have
formed the requisite intent to revoke the will and the will
should therefore be admitted to probate. Although this conclu-
sion is easily stated, the required proof is dependent upon a
number of interrelated issues of law and fact. It is the intention
of this article to examine those issues and their interaction in
such a manner as to provide a logical method for the analysis
of a case of a missing will in Wisconsin.
II. PRESUMPTION OF REVOCATION
If an original will is destroyed by someone without the testa-
tor's consent s or if it has been lost by a third person who had
retained the original will in his possession,9 it is obvious that
there was no intention on the part of the testator to revoke the
will and it is entitled to be admitted to probate. However, a
difficult situation arises where the will was last known to be in
the possession of the testator, but simply cannot be found upon
his death. In such a case it must be determined whether the
will has been lost or accidentally destroyed or whether it has
been revoked by the testator's intentional act causing the origi-
nal document to be destroyed. In Wisconsin, the analysis must
begin with the examination of a long established presumption.
Once it has been established (1) that the testator properly
executed a valid will, (2) that the will was last known to be in
the testator's possession and (3) that the will cannot be found
upon the testator's death, a rebuttable presumption arises that
the testator destroyed the will with the intention of revoking
5. Wis. STAT. § 853.11(2) (1973).
6. Wis. STAT. § 853.11(3) (1973).
7. Wis. STAT. § 853.11(4) (1973).
8. See Estate of Markofske, 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970); Will of Donigian,
265 Wis. 147, 60 N.W.2d 732 (1953); Gavitt v. Moulton, 119 Wis. 35, 96 N.W. 395
(1903). Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.11, Comrnent-1969, at 163 (1971).
9. See In re Steinke's Will, 95 Wis. 121, 70 N.W. 61 (1897).
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it.o This presumption is not a strong one and may be rebutted
by a mere preponderance of the evidence." The rationale un-
derlying the presumption is the assumption that revocation is
the most logical explanation of the fact that the will cannot be
located.' 2 Wisconsin law assumes that, while a missing will
may have been accidentally lost or destroyed by the testator or
have been destroyed by disinherited heirs, most often the ex-
planation for the fact that the will is missing is that it has been
destroyed by the testator with the intention of revoking it.' 3
Since, as the argument goes, destruction with intent to revoke
is the most frequent explanation for the fact that the will can-
not be located, any other explanation for the failure to produce
the will should be demonstrated by affirmative evidence.
It is suggested that the validity of this underlying assump-
tion may be open to some doubt, especially when one considers
that the most likely result of the denial of admission of the lost
will to probate is that the testator will be deemed to have died
intestate. 4 It would seem improbable that the testator having
made a will at one time, or perhaps more significantly, a series
of wills, thereafter planned to die intestate. Although the aver-
age person having made a will is likely to understand the dispo-
sitive effects of that will, it is less likely that he understands
the laws of intestate succession. Therefore, it is unlikely that
he would rely upon such laws to dispose of his estate. Moreover,
by executing the missing will the testator has already demon-
strated a conviction that, at least at the time of execution, the
disposition of his property should be governed by a formal writ-
10. See, e.g., Estate of Fonk, 51 Wis. 2d 339, 187 N.W.2d 147 (1971); In re Will of
Valentine, 93 Wis. 45, 67 N.W. 12 (1896); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.11, Comment-1969,
at 163 (1971).
11. See note 10 supra. See also Estate of Lambert, 252 Wis. 117, 31 N.W.2d 163
(1948); Wendt v. Ziegenhagen, 148 Wis. 382, 134 N.W. 905 (1912); In re Will of Valen-
tine, 93 Wis. 45, 67 N.W. 12 (1896).
12. Estate of Fonk, 51 Wis. 2d 339, 187 N.W.2d 147 (1971); 3 W. PAGE, LAW OF
Wi S § 29.139 at 697-98 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1961).
13. Id.
14. But see Wis. STAT. § 853.11(6) (1973) which provides that when a will has been
revoked by a subsequent will, a later revocation of the revoking instrument by physical
act of the testator effects a revival of the prior will, provided that (1) clear and convinc-
ing evidence is adduced that the testator intended to revive the prior will or (2) the
revoking instrument is a codicil which revoked only part of the will by inconsistency
and not expressly, and the evidence is insufficient to prove that the testator intended
no revival. A will, codicil or part cannot be revived unless the original will or codicil is
produced in court.
1977]
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
ten instrument, rather than by the rules of intestate succession.
In addition, if by force of the presumption of revocation alone,
the will is excluded from probate, 5 then the effect of the pre-
sumption is to effect a revocation of the will without evidence
of compliance with the statutory formalities required by Wis-
consin Statutes section 853.11. Those formalities are designed
not only to prevent fraud, but to prevent any mistake as to the
testator's true intentions by compelling a clear manifestation
of an intention to revoke. 6 Such formalities also act to help
prevent inconsiderate action by the testator and to induce him
to act with appropriate caution in disposing of his property. For
these reasons, it can be forcefully argued that a presumption
which would favor the admission of a lost will is more apt to
further the testator's purpose and is more in line with modern
patterns of estate planning than is the presumption of revoca-
tion. However, the 1971 Revisor's Comment explaining Wis-
consin Statutes section 853.11(1)(b), which deals with revoca-
tion of a will by the purposeful physical act of its destruction,
appears to reject the foregoing argument. 7 The Comment
states in part as follows:
Although witnesses might be required for the destruction
of a will, the popular notion that a testator may revoke sim-
ply by destroying the will itself is too widespread to permit a
change in the law. This section did not change former law in
this regard. That a will in the possession of the testator is
missing at his death gives rise to a presumption of revocation,
but this presumption is easily overcome by evidence that he
referred to his will as still in force, that others who would
benefit by loss of the will had access, or the like.'8
Although the presumption of revocation itself has remained
unchanged over the years, the effect of the presumption has
undergone recent evolution because of changes in the Wiscon-
sin law of evidence. Prior to 1961 the Wisconsin case law estab-
lished that if the proponent of the will produces some evidence
contrary to the presumption and such evidence, if uncontra-
dicted, is sufficient to support a finding of accidental loss or
15. See Estate of Fonk, 51 Wis. 2d 339, 187 N.W.2d 147 (1971), where the court in
excluding the lost will found that there was no probative evidence to overcome the
presumption of revocation.
16. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 853.11, Comment-1969, at 163 (1971).
17. Id.
18. Id.
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destruction or of destruction by a third party without the testa-
tor's consent, the presumption of revocation disappears and the
case is to be decided upon all the facts free from the presump-
tion. 9 Although not expressly acknowledging the fact, by
adopting the rule that the presumption drops out of the case
upon production of sufficient quantum of contrary evidence,
the Wisconsin Supreme Court was utilizing the "bursting bub-
ble" theory of presumptions found in the Model Code of Evi-
dence.20 Under this "bursting bubble" theory, which was cre-
ated by Thayer21 and popularized by Wigmore,12 a presumption
vanishes, or drops out, upon the introduction of evidence sup-
porting a finding of nonexistence of the presumed fact. 23 How-
ever, in Schlichting v. Schlichting,24 a 1961 non-will case, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court specifically rejected the "bursting
bubble" theory with respect to presumptions based upon logic
or reasonable inference. Presumptions based upon logic or rea-
sonable inference may be contrasted with policy-based pre-
sumptions which are invoked without regard to whether the
presumption bears any relationship to the actual fact pre-
sumed.25 The Schlichting court held that, in cases where a
19. Will of Donigian, 265 Wis. 147, 150, 60 N.W.2d 732, 733 (1953). See Will of
Faulks, 246 Wis. 319, 349, 17 N.W.2d 423, 435 (1943).
20. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 704 (1942).
21. J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 313-52 (1898). See also
Laughlin, In Support of the Thayer Theory of Presumptions, 52 MICH. L. REV. 195
(1953).
22. See J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
23. Id.
24. 15 Wis. 2d 147, 157, 112 N.W.2d 149, 155 (1961). In Schlichting the Wisconsin
court dealt with the presumption that a transfer of a homestead was induced by undue
influence if the conveyance were without consideration. Although the defendant intro-
duced "some evidence" contrary to the presumption, the court ruled the inference of
undue influence remained even though the presumption itself was removed because
the presumption was based upon logic or reasonable inference rather than upon policy.
25. See Schlichting v. Schlichting, 15 Wis. 2d 147, 156, 112 N.W.2d 149, 155
(1961). Examples of policy based presumptions are (1) the presumption that a de-
ceased party exercised due care for his own safety; see, e.g., Voight v. Voight, 22 Wis.
2d 573, 126 N.W.2d 543 (1964); Theisen v. Milwaukee Auto. Mut. Ins. Co., 18 Wis. 2d
91, 118 N.W.2d 140 (1962); (2) the presumption that a person, who cannot recall the
facts of an injury because he has suffered retrograde amnesia as a result of the accident,
exercised due care for his own safety; see, e.g., Ernst v. Greenwald, 35 Wis. 2d 763,
151 N.W.2d 706 (1967); Davis v. Fay, 265 Wis. 426, 61 N.W. 2d 885 (1953); Vogel v.
Vetting, 265 Wis. 19, 60 N.W.2d 399 (1953); and (3) the presumption that a person,
relation or state, once established, exists until evidence of a change is shown, such as
the presumptions of lack of change in the condition of goods, Laughlin v. Chicago &
N.W. Ry., 28 Wis. 204 (1871), marriage, Hillard v. Wisconsin Life Ins. Co., 137 Wis.
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presumption is based upon logic or reasonable inference, an
inference nevertheless survives and will support a finding in
favor of the presumed fact even where rebutting evidence is
adduced. 28
Although several Wisconsin lost will cases have been
decided since Schlichting, the force of the presumption of revo-
cation has not been discussed in light of the Schlichting rule.27
For example, in its post-Schlichting decision of Estate of
Fonk, 2 the Wisconsin Supreme Court quoted from Professor
Page's treatise on wills as follows:
This presumption has been adopted as the rule which con-
forms most of the actual facts of human life. While wills are
occasionally destroyed by disinherited heirs, they are much
more frequently destroyed by testator, with the intention of
revoking them. This presumption, therefore, takes the nor-
mal case as the standard, and requires affirmative evidence
of the abnormal case.
29
Although such a view is equivalent to finding that the pre-
sumption is based on logic or probable inference, the court
quoted with approval a passage from Will of Faulks ° to the
effect that when some evidence is introduced which is contrary
to a presumption, such presumption has no probative force.',
However, in Fonk this discussion of the probative effect of a
presumption was dicta because the court held that no evidence
to rebut the presumption of revocation had been presented.32
Under the Schlichting rule, the mere establishment of
facts giving rise to a presumption did not shift the burden of
208, 117 N.W. 999 (1908), and status as a corporate officer, State ex rel. Northwestern
Dev. Corp. v. Gehrz, 230 Wis. 412, 283 N.W. 827 (1939).
26. Schlichting v. Schlichting, 15 Wis. 2d 147, 157, 112 N.W.2d 149, 155 (1961).
See also UNIFORM RuLE OF EVIDENCE 301(a). Cf. Estate of Barnes, 14 Wis. 2d 643, 651-
52, 112 N.W.2d 142, 146 (1961) (concurring opinion). Justice Currie, who also wrote
the opinion of the court in Schlichting, suggested that "whether the rule be stated in
terms of an inference or a presumption makes very little difference from a practical
standpoint."
27. See Estate of Fonk, 51 Wis. 2d 339, 187 N.W.2d 147 (1971); Estate of Mar-
kofske, 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970); Estate of Slama, 18 Wis. 2d 443, 118
N.W.2d 923 (1963).
28. 51 Wis. 2d 339, 187 N.W.2d 147 (1971).
29. Id. at 342, 187 N.W.2d at 149, quoting 3 W. PAGE, LAW OF WILLS § 29.139 at
697-98 (Bowe-Parker rev. 1961).
30. 246 Wis. 319, 17 N.W.2d 423 (1943).
31. 51 Wis. 2d 339, 341-42, 187 N.W.2d 147, 148 (1971).
32. Id. at 346, 187 N.W.2d at 150.
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persuasion.13 The effect of a presumption upon the burden of
proof in Wisconsin was changed by the adoption of the new
Wisconsin Rules of Evidence which became effective on Janu-
ary 1, 1974.31 Section 903.01 of the Rules provides that where
the facts establishing a presumption exist, the opposing party
must prove that the nonexistence of the presumed fact is more
probable than the existence of the presumed fact. 15 Accord-
ingly, under the Rules of Evidence, the establishment of the
presumption is effective to shift the burden of persuasion as
well as the burden of going forward with the evidence. In light
of Schlichting and the Rules of Evidence, it is now appropriate
to say that once the facts giving rise to a presumption are
established, the burden of proof shifts to the opposing party.
As the opposing party comes forward with evidence to meet its
burden, the presumption disappears but the inference arguably
remains to be considered along with the other evidence in de-
termining whether the opposing party has met its burden.3
Although the difference as to which party has the burden
of persuasion could conceivably determine the outcome of a
lost will case, as a practical matter the difference is probably
not relevant to most cases involving lost wills. The proponent
of a will has the burden of proof as to its valid execution. Proof
by the proponent of a lost will that the testator validly executed
the will creates a presumption that the will is valid.7 However,
once the opponent has established that the missing will was
last in the possession of the testator, a presumption arises in
favor of revocation. 38 Consequently, at that point both the bur-
33. 15 Wis. 2d 147, 156, 112 N.W.2d 149, 154-55 (1961); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 903.01,
Judicial Council Committee's Note - 1974 (1975). But see UNIFORM RULE OF EVIDENCE
301(a).
34. Wis. STAT. § 903.01 (1973). These rules apply to courts of record and thus apply
to probate court proceedings. Wis. STAT. §§ 901.01 and 911.01 (1973).
35. Wis. STAT. § 903.01 (1973) provides:
Presumptions in General. Except as provided by statute, a presumption rec-
ognized at common law or created by statute, including statutory provisions
that certain basic facts are prima facie evidence of other facts, imposes on the
party relying on the presumption the burden of proving the basic facts, but once
the basic facts are found to exist the presumption imposes on the party against
whom it is directed the burden of proving that the non-existence of the pre-
sumed fact is more probable than its existence.
36. See In re Estate of Malnar, 73 Wis. 2d 192, 203 n.2, 243 N.W.2d 435, 441 n.2
(1976).
37. In re Estate of Malnar, 73 Wis. 2d 192, 199, 243 N.W.2d 435, 439 (1976); Estate
of Barnes, 14 Wis. 2d 643, 112 N.W.2d 142 (1961).
38. Cases cited note 10 supra.
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den of persuasion and the burden of going forward with the
evidence shift to the proponent requiring him to establish that
the will was not revoked. That is, the proponent must prove
that the will was lost, destroyed by accident or destroyed with-
out the testator's consent.
Ill. REBUTTING THE PRESUMPTION
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has consistently held in
many lost will cases over the years that the presumption of
revocation can be and often is easily overcome by evidence
demonstrating that the testator did not intend that his will be
revoked. Of course, this may be established by evidence that
the testator lacked the capacity to revoke the will.39 More
likely, however, the evidence will relate to the testator's affir-
mations of the existence of the will, to his propensity not to
retain or properly care for valuable documents, to the access of
adverse parties affording them an opportunity to cause the
disappearance or destruction of the will, to the testator's his-
tory of relying on written wills and to the relationship between
the testator and his heirs-at-law and the beneficiaries of his
will. In most instances, the proponent will attempt to present
a broad spectrum of evidence indicating a pattern of the testa-
tor's intention to effect a testamentary disposition of his assets.
Each case will usually involve several factors and it is fair to
say that no single factor has controlled the court's decisions.
However, it is possible to categorize these factors into basic
groups which will almost inevitably be the focus of any case
involving the attempt to probate a will which was allegedly
lost, destroyed by accident or destroyed without the testator's
consent.
A. Evidence of Carelessness with Valuable Papers
The Wisconsin Supreme Court has often considered
whether the testator's character traits, habits or behavior pat-
terns were of such a nature as to support a finding that the
testator accidentally misplaced or lost his will.4" Accordingly,
evidence of a testator's carelessness with valuable papers is
39. Wis. STAT. § 853.01 (1973); cf. Estate of Svendso, 257 Wis. 335, 43 N.W.2d 343
(1950).
40. Estate of Markofske, 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970); Estate of Lambert,
252 Wis. 117, 31 N.W.2d 163 (1948); Gavitt v. Moulton, 119 Wis. 35, 96 N.W. 395
(1903); Jamison v. Snyder, 79 Wis. 286, 48 N.W. 261 (1891).
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frequently cited by the court as indicating the accidental loss
or destruction of the will rather than its revocation.41 For exam-
ple, in Estate of Lambert," the contestant contended that be-
cause the will was not found in the testator's strong box, it was
probably revoked by the testator. In response the court empha-
sized that the fact that a large check was found in the testator's
shirt pocket indicated that the testator was careless with his
valuable property so that the absence of the will from the box
would not preclude the trial court from concluding that it had
not been revoked. In Gavitt v. Moulton,43 the court admitted a
lost will to probate and in doing so noted that the testator was
over eighty years old and careless in the keeping of his impor-
tant papers. In Estate of Markofske," the court found it signifi-
cant that during a search of the testatrix's room a large number
of negotiable bonds were found under newspapers, leaving an
inference that testatrix did not make suitable provision for the
safekeeping of her important documents. Conversely, evidence
of habitual care in the keeping of important papers can be used
to support the presumption. In Jamison v. Snyde 45 the court
pointed out that the testator was careful in the keeping of his
numerous valuable papers in his possession and stated, "[I]t
is certainly strange, if he had not intentionally destroyed his
will, that it was not found among these papers."4
B. History of Relying on Wills
If the testator had a history of relying upon written wills as
his intended means of disposing of his property at death, such
past reliance is a strong indication that he would be unlikely
to intentionally die intestate.47 Similarities or general trends for
the disposition of the testator's property which can be dis-
cerned among the testator's prior wills and the lost will are
further evidence that the testamentary plan is an established
one which the testator would not purposefully forsake. 8 For
41. Cases cited note 38 supra.
42. 252 Wis. 117, 31 N.W.2d 163 (1948).
43. 119 Wis. 35, 96 N.W. 395 (1903).
44. 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970).
45. 79 Wis. 286, 48 N.W. 261 (1891).
46. Id. at 288, 48 N.W. at 261.
47. Estate of Markofske, 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970); Will of Donigian,
265 Wis. 147, 60 N.W.2d 732 (1953); Will of Lauburg, 170 Wis. 502, 175 N.W. 925
(1920).
48. Cases cited note 45 supra.
19771
MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW
example, in Will of Lauburg,49 the testatrix made one will in
1913, but later revoked it by executing a new will in 1915 which
could not be found at the time of her death. The court noted
that in both her wills the testatrix "steadfastly adhered to her
purpose" of making the special provisions contained in the lost
will in favor of two of her children, and held that this was one
of the "facts and circumstances" which rebutted the presump-
tion of revocation." The court further noted that the testatrix
was an intelligent person who must have known that if she
revoked her will and died intestate, then contrary to her inten-
tion all of her children would share equally in her estate.5' In
Will of Donigian,52 a case involving a testator who had made a
series of wills during his lifetime, the court found that when the
testator became dissatisfied with his current will, "his custom
was to replace it with one more to his liking. ' 53 The court also
noted that the most recent of the wills in the series executed
by the testator established a pattern of making generous provi-
sions for his nephew and for various charities. 51 Similarly, in
upholding a lost will in Estate of Markofske, 5 the court found
it significant that a comparison of testatrix's two prior wills
with a copy of the lost will showed few substantial differences.5"
C. Relationships with Beneficiaries and Heirs
If, after the execution of the lost will, testator's relation-
ships with the beneficiaries (or non-beneficiaries) of that will
remained essentially unchanged, it may be assumed that the
testator would have no reason to revoke his will.5 7 In Wendt v.
Ziegenhagen,51 the court held that the only issue was whether
the presumption of revocation had been rebutted.59 The court
then found that the only perceivable reason for the testator to
destroy his will with the intention to revoke would have been
49. 170 Wis. 502, 175 N.W. 925 (1920).
50. Id. at 505-06, 175 N.W.at 926.
51. Id. at 505, 175 N.W. at 926.
52. 265 Wis. 147, 60 N.W.2d 732 (1953).
53. Id. at 152, 60 N.W.2d at 734.
54. Id.
55. 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970).
56. Id. at 777, 178 N.W.2d at 14.
57. Will of Lauburg, 170 Wis. 502, 175 N.W. 925 (1920); Wendt v. Ziegenhagen,
148 Wis. 382, 134 N.W. 905 (1912).
58. 148 Wis. 382, 134 N.W. 905 (1912).
59. Id. at 388, 134 N.W. at 907.
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to enlarge his son's share of his estate. However, just prior to
the execution of the missing will, the testator had brought two
lawsuits against his son indicating, in the opinion of the court,
animosity toward the son. The court concluded that the testa-
tor's relationship with his son had not changed and, therefore,
that the testator had no reason to change the disposition of his
estate by revoking the will. Similarly, in Will of Lauburg0 the
testatrix made special provision in the lost will for two of her
seven children. In admitting the lost will to probate the court
noted that the children who received the special treatment
were the testatrix's son who was mentally handicapped and her
daughter who lived in the testatrix's home.
In both Wendt and Lauburg, the court admitted the lost
wills to probate because, among other things, the testator's
relationship with the beneficiaries had not changed since the
execution of the lost will. Conversely, where the testator's rela-
tionship with the beneficiaries has changed, this change may
be a factor in refusing to admit the lost will to probate. For
example, in Estate of Fonk1 the court noted that after the
testatrix allegedly reaffirmed a will which left her estate to
persons other than her heirs-at-law, the circumstances of her
life changed. The testatrix moved to another city to live with
her sister, one of her intestate heirs. The court stated that this
substantial change in circumstances could lead to the inference
that good reason existed in the testatrix's mind for the revoca-
tion of her will. 2 Similarly, in Estate of Slama,13 a case in
which the will was not actually lost but had been mutilated by
the tearing off of the first page, the court noted that if the will
were not admitted, the testator would die intestate. However,
the court felt that such a result was entirely consistent with the
testator's intentions. The will was made of heavy bond paper
which would have taken a conscious effort to tear and would
preclude the possibility of a thoughtless or mistaken act. More-
over, there was substantial evidence that the testator had be-
come disenchanted with the beneficiaries of the missing will
and had formed the opinion that although they wanted his
money, they were unwilling to care for him.
60. 170 Wis. 502, 175 N.W. 925 (1920).
61. 51 Wis. 2d 339, 187 N.W.2d 147 (1971).
62. Id. at 346, 187 N.W.2d at 151.
63. 18 Wis. 2d 443, 118 N.W.2d 923 (1963).
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D. Affirmations of the Existence of the Will
Perhaps the factor most frequently found in Wisconsin lost
will cases involves the testator's declarations affirming the ex-
istence of the missing will." In fact, to date, in every Wisconsin
case in which a lost will has been admitted to probate, the
testator had in the opinion of the court at some time and to
some extent affirmed the existence of the will. In Estate of
Markofske," the testatrix affirmed the existence of her will four
or five months before her death by informing her sister that the
sister's son was the executor of the will. This reaffirmation,
together with other factors, was held sufficient to rebut the
presumption of revocation. In Will of Donigian," the missing
will was executed five months prior to the testator's death and
he had expressed satisfaction with its provisions three weeks
before his death. In Gavitt v. Moulton" the court noted that
not long before the testator's death, he had declared that this
will was executed and was still effective. In Estate of
Lambert,8 the testator made persistent statements of satisfac-
tion with the contents of his will up to the day of his death.
Similarly, in Will of Lauburg,9 the testatrix made statements
up to the time of her death affirming the existence of her will
which made special provision for her mentally handicapped
son. In Wendt v. Ziegenhagen,70 the court found that the testa-
tor recognized the will's existence and affirmatively asserted
that he did not wish to change it. The statements were made
on four different occasions - once three or four years prior to
his death, again a year or two before his death, a third time
during the last years of his life and finally during the last year
of his life.
In In re Steinke's Will," the testatrix reaffirmed the exist-
ence of her will three days prior to her death and made a num-
64. Estate of Fonk, 51 Wis. 2d 339, 187 N.W.2d 147 (1971); Estate of Markofske,
47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970); Will of Donigian, 265 Wis. 147, 60 N.W.2d 732
(1953); Estate of Lambert, 252 Wis. 117, 31 N.W. 2d 163 (1948); Will of Lauburg, 170
Wis. 502, 175 N.W. 925 (1920); Wendt v. Ziegenhagen, 148 Wis. 382, 134 N.W. 905
(1912); Gavitt v. Moulton, 119 Wis. 35, 96 N.W. 395 (1903); In re Steinke's Will, 95
Wis. 121, 70 N.W. 61 (1897).
65. 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970).
66. 265 Wis. 147, 60 N.W.2d 732 (1953).
67. 119 Wis. 35, 96 N.W. 395 (1903).
68. 252 Wis. 117, 31 N.W.2d 163 (1948).
69. 170 Wis. 502, 175 N.W. 925 (1920).
70. 148 Wis. 382, 134 N.W. 905 (1912).
71. 95 Wis. 121, 70 N.W. 61 (1897).
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ber of statements to different people that the will was un-
changed and was still in the possession of the notary public who
drafted it. The court held that if the notary had lost the will,
the presumption of revocation would never arise because the
testatrix would not have had the opportunity to destroy it.
Turning to the possibility that she did in fact have the will in
her possession, the court stated:
Her declarations upon the subject of the existence or non-
existence of the will and its custody, up to or within a short
time previous to her death, are competent evidence to rebut
such presumption, and to show that she died in the belief
that the will was still in existence as a valid disposition of her
estate .72
Finally, in Estate of Fonk7 the court summarized the cases
in which the presumption of revocation was held to have
dropped out because of, among other factors, recent reaffirma-
tions of the existence of the will or expressions of satisfaction
with its contents. However, the court found in that case that
the testatrix's inquiry to her attorney six years prior to her
death as to the validity of her will was so ambiguous as to be
entirely without probative value. 74 It was pointed out that the
inquiry could be interpreted not only as a declaration that the
testatrix wanted her will to remain in effect, but as an inquiry
as to whether or not she should change it. With this dated,
ambiguous declaration as the only evidence to rebut the pre-
sumption of revocation, the court held that the presumption
had not been overcome.
An examination of the foregoing cases involving recent reaf-
firmations of the will by the testator will reveal that evidence
as to additional factors has almost uniformly been presented.
Such additional evidence is especially helpful because of the
difficulty in determining the relevancy and weight of the affir-
mations in light of the time difference between the last affirma-
tion and the date of death. Presumably for this reason the
cases, especially Fonk, may be read as requiring that the testa-
tor's reaffirmation of the will's existence must have been rela-
tively close to death to be probative. This is not to say there is
some arbitrary date beyond which the statements are not pro-
72. Id. at 126, 70 N.W. at 62.
73. 51 Wis. 2d 339, 187 N.W.2d 147 (1971).
74. Id. at 343, 87 N.W.2d at 149.
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bative. Rather, the effect of the reaffirmations, if any, must be
examined in the context of all of the other evidence in deter-
mining whether or not the presumption of revocation has been
overcome.
E. Adverse Party's Access to Will
Unlike the other factors, the effect of an adverse party's
access to the will involves considerations extraneous to the tes-
tator's state of mind. The disappearance of the will can be
significant only in revealing the testator's intention as to revo-
cation if he was responsible for its disappearance. '5 If others are
responsible for the will's disappearance without the testator's
knowledge or after his death, the requisite intent of the testator
to revoke is necessarily absent. Thus, the interest of a party
whose economic interest may be detrimentally affected by the
existence of a will has been a factor given weight in several
missing will cases. For example, in Gavitt v. Moulton"6 a
woman purporting to be the testator's wife had access to the
testator's rooms and papers for several days prior to his death
and while he was unconscious. In addition, the evidence re-
vealed that the woman had, in fact, removed some papers from
the testator's room after his death. The court concluded that
this access, together with other factors present in the case, was
sufficient to overcome the presumption of revocation. The
court commented, "True, the mere fact that the contestant had
an opportunity to destroy the will would not of itself overcome
the presumption that it was destroyed by the testator with the
intent to revoke it; still it is a circumstance to be considered
with other proof.""
Direct proof of wrongdoing by the person benefiting from
the absence of a will is unnecessary. In Will of Donigian,8 the
court noted that there was no evidence to suggest that the
search had not been conscientiously done, but nevertheless
found that the force of the presumption was diminished by the
access of interested parties to the will:
We consider, further, that the very existence of the presump-
75. Estate of Markofske, 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970); Will of Donigian,
265 Wis. 147, 60 N.W.2d 732 (1953); Gavitt v. Moulton, 119 Wis. 35, 96 N.W. 395
(1903).
76. 119 Wis. 35, 96 N.W. 395 (1903).
77. Id. at 49-50, 96 N.W. at 400.
78. 265 Wis. 147, 60 N.W.2d 732 (1953).
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tion ...depends on the tacit assumption that a diligent
search was made for the will by persons trying to find it. We
are far from charging that the contestant and his associates
did not search in good faith and there is no evidence but what
they did; but whatever virtue the presumption created by a
failure to find may start with, that virtue is seriously dimin-
ished when it must depend on a search made by those whose
interests will be impaired by production of the will."
Similar language in Estate of Markofske0 provides that the
fact that the search for the missing will involved a party whose
interest would be furthered by the lack of a will is a factor
which "lessens the impact of the presumption of revocation." 8'
Conversely, it would appear that evidence of the lack of access
to the will by adverse parties may be valuable in establishing
the revocation of the will. For example, it is suggested that
such lack of access could be especially significant to an oppo-
nent who wishes to rely on the presumption of revocation by
helping to establish that the missing will was last known to be
in the testator's possession.
IV. CONCLUSION
Where it is established that (1) the testator properly exe-
cuted a valid will, (2) the will was last known to be in the
testator's possession and (3) the will cannot be found upon the
testator's death, a rebuttable presumption arises that the tes-
tator destroyed the will with the intention of revoking it. Al-
though the rationale underlying this presumption may be sub-
ject to question, it is suggested that the presumption appears
so well established that it will continue to constitute the basis
of analysis of future Wisconsin decisions involving lost wills.
The application of the Schlichting rule to a lost will case is
probably not significant. Any inference remaining as a result
of the presumption of revocation is presumably offset by the
inference remaining from the presumption of validity arising
from the proof of valid execution. Under the new Wisconsin
Rules of Evidence, the fact that the existence of a presumption
shifts the burden of proof may significantly aid the opponent
of the will. That is, the burden of proving that the missing will
79. Id. at 153, 60 N.W.2d at 735.
80. 47 Wis. 2d 769, 178 N.W.2d 9 (1970).
81. Id. at 778, 178 N.W.2d at 14.
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was not revoked shifts to the proponent of the will as soon as
the opponent has established that the validly executed but
missing will was last known to be in the testator's possession.
Although it is possible that, in the absence of other credible
evidence, a lost will case could be decided solely on the basis
of the effect of presumption of revocation, it is suggested that
other probative evidence will almost always be available. Al-
though this evidence can be categorized and stated in broad
terms, it will inevitably involve many items which may not, in
themselves, appear significant. Evidence of an uncashed check
found in an unlikely place, a subtle pattern discerned from a
previous will, a small gift on an occasion to one party but not
to another or a passing remark as to who the testator believes
will handle his estate may have little weight when considered
as isolated items. However, it is an analysis of items such as
these that, when taken together, will establish (1) the testator's
capacity or lack thereof to revoke; (2) his propensity or lack
thereof to retain or properly care for valuable documents; (3)
an adverse party's opportunity or lack thereof to cause the
disappearance or destruction of the will; (4) the testator's pat-
tern of relying on a will or wills to effect a testamentary
disposition of property; and (5) the nature of the relationship
of the decedent to the proponents of and the objectors to the
missing will.
[Vol. 60:351
